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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Cold War has ended. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFT A), World 
Trade Organization (WTO), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and 
the European Union have changed the global political and economic landscape in only a 
few short years. This review draws together responses from national and California 
public opinion surveys over the past ten years to paint a broad picture of the public's 
views on foreign trade. 
Neither trade isolationism nor international activism have become dominant directions in 
American public opinion. 'vVhat has emerged is adoption by the public of a position best 
characterized by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations as "pragmatic 
internationalism." 1 "Pragmatic internationalism" means that Americans are generally 
committed to an active trade and foreign relations role for the U.S. in the world.2 Despite 
polling limitations, the accumulated findings over a ten-year period support the view that 
the public is generally aware of both the positive and negative impacts of foreign trade on 
their home life.3 The public has also become more concerned about economic 
vulnerability, which, in tum, affects opinions about broader international issues (U.S. 
policy toward Japan and China, for example). 
The various limitations of public opinion polls and the fluid nature of public opinion, 
make it difficult to precisely describe the public's views on foreign trade policy. Only 
national or state polls conducted by established and well-known pollsters are cited in this 
review. Nonetheless, different polls, even completed at the same time, may record 
significant differences in opinion about specific issues depending on how the question is 
worded, the size of the sample, the surveyed geographic region, and other factors. A poll 
may cause the respondent to develop an opinion in response to poll questions, an opinion 
that they may not have held prior to being asked. In nearly all cases, the pollster did not 
ask the same question from year to year, nor did different pollsters use the same 
questions. Coverage of significant foreign trade issues is quite spotty and varies over the 
ten-year period covered in this review. In some cases, different polls have been pulled 
together in a single graph in an attempt to show historical trends. 
In general, public opinion polls suggest that Americans tend to view economic rather than 
military power as the most significant measure of global strength. But the public and its 
leaders disagree on the level of support they give this viewpoint. In 1998, 63 percent of 
the public and 89 percent of the nation's leaders* agreed that economic power is the most 
significant measure of global strength, a 26 percentage point difference. 4 
• Unless noted otherwise, this term follows the Chicago Council of Foreign Relations (CCFR) usage which 
defines "leaders" as: "Americans in senior positions with knowledge of international affairs. Roughly, 
equal proportions were included from the House of Representatives, the Senate, and the administration. 
Leaders were also drawn from the business community, the media, academia and private foreign policy 
institutes. A smaller number of leaders was drawn from national labor unions, churches and special interest 
groups relevant to foreign policy." John E. Rielly, American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1999 
(Chicago: the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1999) at http://www.ccfr.org. 
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A similar and long-standing difference has existed between the U.S. public and U.S. 
leaders across several foreign trade and policy dimensions (Table 1 ). Concerns about 
Table 1 
Differences in opinion between U.S. public and leaders agreeing with the 
following statements (excluding "no opinion") (1998) 
Public Leaders Gap 
Economic competition from low-wage countries is a critical threat. 69% 31% 38% 
Protecting the jobs of American workers is a very important goal. 83% 45% 38% 
'r. ·cc, .,_ rro.n '"' on 
VV 'U .JV 'U 
The U.S. does not have a vital interest in Brazil. 58% 24% 34% 
The U.S. does not have a vital interest in Mexico. 29% 6% 23% 
The U.S. should not contribute to the IMF to meet world financial crisis. 67% 16% 51% 
Economic competition from Japan is a critical threat. 47% 14% 32% 
Source: John E. Rielly, American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1999 (Chicago: the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 
1999), p. 38. (Available at httn:/iwv.w.ccfi·.ont.) 
international economic competition and job loss are of greater concern to the general 
public than to the leaders, as the first three questions in Table 1 indicate. Other polls 
have found that the public is more likely to say that the U.S. has a vital interest in a 
foreign nation when an economic and political crisis occurs there. 5 As Table 1 shows, 
the general public is also much more inclined than leaders to agree that the U.S. does not 
have a vital interest in Brazil. In the case of Mexico, a large majority of the public and 
leaders agree the U.S. has a vital interest in Mexico, but the magnitude of agreement 
varies. The general public is also less positively inclined than leaders toward the U.S. 
contributing to the International Monetary Fund. A little less than half of the public, 
compared to only 14 percent ofleaders, sees economic competition with Japan as a 
threat. 
The differences between opinions of the U.S public and leaders may reflect the leaders' 
more detailed knowledge of economic policy, and perhaps their relatively more secure 
economic position. In some cases, leaders may have failed to educate and persuade the 
public to their view. There also may be substantial differences in the ways in which 
economic foreign policy outcomes affect the two groups, leading to differences in 
perceived personal risk or benefit. Blue-collar workers, for example, have a direct stake 
in the movement of manufacturing jobs overseas. 
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PUBLIC INTEREST IN FOREIGN TRADE NEWS 
In 1999, 39 percent of Americans felt that they were very knowledgeable or 
knowledgeable about foreign trade, compared to 44 percent reporting little or no 
knowledge. 6 Nonetheless, public interest in national news, U.S. foreign relations, and 
news about other countries declined from 1994 through 1998. Interest in news about 
foreign countries, defined as "very interested," declined from a high of 36 percent in 
1990 to 33 percent in 1994, to 29 percent in 1998. 7 Even so, this interest in foreign 
countries was higher than the period between 1974 and 1986.8 Outright lack of interest in 
foreign news has diminished somewhat over the long run. Individuals with higher levels 
of education or international travel experience are more apt to follow news of fOreigu. 
countries (as much as 7 percentage points higher).9 
Chart 1 
Percent of Public Very Interested in Foreign 
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Source: John E. Rielly, American Public Opinion and US. Foreign Policy 1999. Chicago: the 
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, at http://www.ccfr.org 
A characteristic pattern of episodic public attention to foreign trade issues is well 
illustrated by the recent debate over U.S. Congressional approval of the WTO treaty with 
China. In the first months of 2000, only 29 percent of Americans claimed to be following 
news about the issue either "very" or "somewhat closely." According to Gallup, "the 
current level of attention paid to China and the WTO is among the lowest registered 
when compared to more than 60 other news events that Gallup has measured since 
1991." 10 Yet, a few weeks later, when the issue was closer to a vote by Congress, 41 
percent of the public said that they had been following the issue.* A similar pattern was 
seen during the NAFTA debates. In both cases, public interest increased as a significant 
political action became imminent and attracted more media coverage. 
In 1998, newspapers and television were perceived by the public to be the most reliable 
source of foreign policy information (Chart 2). Radio was next and the Internet last. 
• The public attention given to China's admission to the WTO was similar to that given to the "Who Wants 
to be a Millionaire" broadcast three months earlier. Gallup Poll, May 23, 2000. 
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Interestingly, an equal percentage (27 percent) of those surveyed felt that either the 
Internet was "not reliable" or is a "very reliable" source of foreign policy information. 11 
Chart 2 
Percent of the Am eric an Public Identifying a Media 
as "most reliable" (1998) 
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Council on Foreign Relations, at http://www.ccfr.org 
Foreign Trade and Personal Economic Security 
"Pragmatic internationalism," as defined in this analysis, means that the U.S. public tends 
to see U.S. foreign policy largely as an instrument to achieve personal economic security. 
In 1998, competition from low wage countries was considered a critical threat by 42 
percent of the American public, but only 16 percent of the leaders held this view. 12 
International terrorism, chemical and biological weapons, and other issues were also 
perceived as "critical threats" by the public. In each case, the public expressed 
significantly more concern than the leaders, showing an eight percent to 31 percent 
difference. 13 The greatest difference centered on "protecting American jobs," with 80 
percent of the public giving this a high priority as a U.S. foreign policy goal, compared to 
45 percent of the leaders. These public opinion polls findings suggest that the general 
public and leaders do not rank foreign policy concerns the same way. In another example 
of this dichotomy, a 1994 poll found that, the public ranked international trade (free trade 
with other countries and trade relationships) sixth among the top ten issues. The leaders 
ranked it first, followed by concerns about the world economy (seventh). 14 
Most of the time the foreign policy issues have relatively limited visibility, but specific 
events can place them on the public's agenda. In a 1994 poll, respondents were asked to 
name a law or bill that Congress had recently passed. Only 5 percent identified NAFT A 
(enacted the previous year), compared to 44 percent who identified a crime bill, and 20 
percent who mentioned the Brady handgun bill (37 percent could not name any bill).15 
However in a second 1994 poll, the public gave top ranking to economic competition and 
immigration as significant threats. The public more widely believed that economic 
competition with Japan and risks to American workers were greater domestic threats than 
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did leaders (43 percent compared to 33 percent). 16 Economic concerns continued to 
increase during the decade, with the public identifying U.S. world trade and the trade 
balance as significant issues in 1998. Leaders were even more concerned, placing the 
world economy and concerns about the Asian economic crises at the top of their list. 17 A 
2000 national poll of registered voters found that 48 percent agreed with the statement 
that "foreign trade has been bad for the U.S. economy," compared to 34 percent who 
agreed that it had been good for the U.S. economy. 18 
The U.S. public is pragmatic about foreign trade, identifying the larger selection of goods 
and products imported from other countries as a positive. This view was expressed by 58 
percent of the respondents m a 1999 poll. IlTiports were also perceived as helping poorer 
families to reduce their cost ofliving (69 percent agreed). The public also agreed that 
imports keep American manufacturers on their toes and make them work harder to 
improve the quality of their products (73 percent). 19 In a second 1999 national poll, 56 
percent of the respondents agreed that foreign trade provides an opportunity for economic 
growth through exports, compared to 36 percent who agreed that foreign trade is a threat 
because of imports.20 In general, these polls report themes of economic security and 
pragmatism. Respondents support international competition and reaping the benefits of 
cheap foreign products at the lowest possible cost to U.S. jobs. 
Prior to 1994, many Americans felt that foreign policy had a substantial impact on the 
nation's overall economy. This view changed in 1994 for a brief period. The nation was 
perceived as less vulnerable to foreign influences, even if personal vulnerability and job 
insecurity remained serious concerns. 21 In the mid-1990s, when asked if trade pulls down 
wages, two-thirds of American respondents said yes. 22 A 1995 poll found the public 
sharply divided by type of employment as to whether jobs being exported to other 
countries were a threat to "people like themselves"; 55 percent ofblue-collar and union 
members saw a threat compared to 38 percent of executives and professionals.Z3 One 
commentator held that this split could reflect the level of blue-collar unemployment at the 
time and fears about job retention. A general restructuring of the market place, resulting 
in the loss of many blue-collar jobs, had occurred between the late 1980s and mid-
1990s.24 As a result of plant closures and layoffs, some workers had to accept jobs at 
significantly lower wages.25 In a poll published in 1996, about the same number of 
respondents who agreed that corporate downsizing was bad also agreed that foreign trade 
agreements had cost American jobs (59 percent and 54 percent respectively).26 
Public concern about competition with Japan dropped from 62 percent in 1994 to 45 
percent in 1998, a period during which the U.S. economy improved but the Japanese 
economy floundered. 27 In 1998, the public again agreed that foreign policy affected the 
nation's overall economy (63 percent), but only 38 percent agreed that it had a major 
impact on their personal standard of living, reversing the opinions in 1994. Still, like the 
1994 poll, those individuals most likely to believe that foreign policy had an impact on 
their personal style of life were those with less than a college education and yearly 
incomes under $25,000?8 A 1999 poll of Americans who reported a household job loss 
found that only 6 percent agreed that the loss resulted from a company moving to Mexico 
or another country, or that foreign competition was the reason for the job loss.29 
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Californians were divided in 1996 in their opinions as to whether U.S. trade with other 
countries creates more or fewer jobs in the state. About one third agreed that foreign 
trade creates more jobs, with more men ( 41 percent) holding this position than women 
(26 percent). In contrast, 40 percent of the respondents felt that foreign trade leads to a 
reduction in jobs, with slightly more women (43 percent) than men (38 percent) 
agreeing. 30 A different question, asked in 1997, sought to determine Californians' 
perceptions about whether foreign trade helps or hurts the economy. Nearly a third of the 
respondents felt that trade either helps a lot or somewhat, in contrast to a quarter who felt 
that trade hurts the economy. Men were more likely to be positive (38 percent compared 
to 27 percent for women), while women were slightly more inclined to be believe that 
1] trade hurts the economy (28 percent compared to 23 percent for men).-
Globalization 
The International Monetary Fund defines globalization as "the growing economic 
interdependence of countries worldwide through the increasing volume and variety of 
cross-border transactions in goods and services and of international capital flows, and 
also through the more rapid and widespread diffusion of technology. "32 A 1998 poll 
found that the public agreed that U.S. overall economic strength is more important than 
military strength (63 percent); 89 percent ofleaders agreed. In addition, 54 percent of the 
public and 87 percent of the leaders felt that increasing connections between the U.S. 
economy and the economies of other nations are positive.33 This level of confidence does 
not translate into personal economic security. A recent poll (2000) found that only 43 
percent of the public agrees that the global economy will help the average U.S. citizen, 
compared to 52 percent who are of the opinion that it will hurt.34 
An individual's level of education and foreign travel experience are positively related to a 
supportive view of globalization. For example, in 1998, 58 percent of college graduates 
and 68 percent of individuals with post-graduate education favored globalization, 
compared to 46 percent of high school graduates. People with international travel 
experience were more supportive, 58 percent to 46 percent. Age was not a significant 
indicator, as about half the respondents in each age group supported globalization.35 
In a 1998 survey, the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations concluded: 
Findings that Americans are positive about economic interdependence are 
congruent with other established evidence that Americans are relatively 
sophisticated about the importance of overseas developments for the U.S. 
domestic economy. Among the public, U.S. foreign policy is viewed as having a 
major impact on our overall economy (cited by 66%) and on domestic 
unemployment (54%), though a relatively small 36% feel the same way about its 
influence on their own personal standard of living. 36 
Even though polls find that the U.S. public is generally positive about globalization, and 
understands the interdependence between the domestic economy, employment and 
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overseas developments, poll findings (Chart 3) suggest a rising level of concern. In a 
1998 poll about NAFTA and keeping jobs within the U.S., four-fifths of the citizen 
respondents ranked protecting American workers as "very important. "37 Leaders, in 
contrast, were much more focused on issues involving the world economy in 1998. 
Leaders most concerned were concentrated in the business community (25 percent), 
compared to 11 percent of labor leaders, and 16 percent of leaders in government or 
d . 38 aca em1a. 
A 2001 review of recent public opinion polls indicates that U.S. citizens recognize both 
the costs and benefits of integration of the nation's economy with the world economy, but 
tend to weigh the costs as being higher than the benefits. 39 Second, the survey data 
supports earlier findings that less-skilled workers are much more likely to oppose free 
trade than more skilled workers.4° Finally, this skills-preferences gap may reflect 
different wage-growth patterns since the early 1970s. Less skilled workers experienced 
close to zero or even negative wage growth relative to higher skilled workers.41 
The Seattle World Trade Organization meeting in 1999 focused public attention on 
corporate foreign trade practices relating to labor and environmental issues. Frost 
summarizes labor and environmental concerns as follows: "As they see it, these 
corporations are abandoning workers and communities to pursue profits around the 
world. In so doing they are destroying U.S. jobs, undermining health and safety 
standards, exploiting foreign workers, and polluting the global environrnent."42 Ricardo 
Melendez-Ortiz, at the International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development, 
25 
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Source: John E. Rielly, American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy /999 (Chicago, IL: 
the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1999) at http://www.ccfr.org., p. 19. 
Geneva, suggests that developing countries, who now make up a majority of the members 
of the WTO, are also concerned about the impact of these same issues in their own 
countries.43 There may be some convergence of opinion between the American public's 
concerns about jobs and other globalization issues, and various non-government 
organizations and developing nations relative to the WTO and other global bodies and 
policies. 
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International Trade Barriers 
Historically, support of trade barriers is tied to protecting American jobs, fairer prices and 
other factors. Although a plurality of voters supported trade barriers in 1994 ( 48 
percent), this was the lowest percentage ever recorded in the Chicago Council of Foreign 
Relations national survey.44 Higher income individuals were more inclined than the 
general public to support retaining tariffs. 
Polls find a trend of general public support for reducing tariffs. 45 In 1997, the public 
either strongly or somewhat agreed (79 percent) that reducing trade barriers was an 
important way to increase U.S. trade with other countnes ... 6 Support for tanffs among 
leaders increased from 20 percent in 1994 to 34 percent in 1998.47 Just six months before 
the WTO meeting in Seattle, a majority of Americans (59 percent) agreed that the U.S. 
should take the lead in reducing trade barriers.48 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
In a 1997 survey, the U.S. public was divided about the job-creating potential of 
international trade agreements. A significant portion ( 42 percent) agreed that such 
agreements cost jobs. Nearly as many (41 percent) agreed that trade agreements both 
create and cost jobs. Only 7 percent agreed that trade only creates jobs.49 A similar 
opinion pattern emerged in an October 2000 poll. About a third (35 percent) of the 
Americans surveyed felt that free trade agreements between the U.S. and foreign 
countries have helped the U.S. economy, about a third (32 percent) felt they have hurt it, 
and 24 percent were of the opinion that trade agreements do not make much difference. 5° 
In 1999, three quarters of Americans surveyed felt that human rights abuses, illegal 
transfers oftechnology, and allegations of illegal contributions in U.S. political races 
should be addressed during the WTO agreement negotiations. Still, less than a majority 
agreed about the effectiveness of such efforts. About 48 percent of the respondents felt 
that this approach is effective while 40 percent agreed that it does not work. 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
NAFTA was approved by the Senate and signed by the President in 1993. In December 
1994, 68 percent ofthe public surveyed were following the issue. 51 Three years later, far 
fewer were actively interested, with 43 percent saying they had "heard a lot" or "quite a 
bit" about the issue, and 57 percent reported "not much" or "little. "52 This 25 percent 
drop in public attention could reflect either a decline in news coverage about NAFT A or 
a decrease in people's interest. 
In 1994, half the public agreed that NAFTA was "mostly good" for the U.S. economy, 
compared to about a third who saw it as "mostly bad" (Chart 4). Union households 
tended to be more opposed (48 percent) than all working people (40 percent). 53 Leaders 
were the most supportive (86 percent). By 1996, the public had become less certain 
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about NAFTA, with about halfmoving into the "do not know" category (47 percent). 54 
California public support for NAFT A was also evenly divided in a 1996 poll. 55 Two 
1997 national polls provided different assessments ofthe public's view ofNAFTA's 
economic impact. In response to a broad, more generalized question, the public agreed 
that NAFT A was good for the nation. 56 But, when asked more directly about the 
economy, they were less certain about how good it was. 57 This same ambivalence 
showed up in a 2000 poll, where the public responded that NAFTA did not have a strong 
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In 1994, 21 percent of business executives surveyed agreed that NAFTA would help to 
reduce costs and to increase demand. 59 A bare majority (52 percent) agreed NAFTA 
would help their businesses, compared to 48 percent who thought NAFT A would not 
make much of a difference.60 A large majority (79 percent) of business executives agreed 
that non-U.S. companies would establish operations in Mexico to take advantage of 
NAFTA. In their view, the largest percentage of such companies would be Japanese (82 
percent), followed by Korean (57 percent), Western European (55 percent), and South 
American (31 percent).61 
The public was asked in 1994 to compare how well business and unions had handled the 
implementation ofNAFTA. Business received a much higher rating (43 percent positive) 
than labor (27 percent positive).62 
The public grew more negative over time about the impact ofNAFTA on jobs and wages. 
A majority (52 percent) of the public surveyed in a 1994 poll thought that NAFTA would 
help the overall job situation. In contrast, 32 percent agreed that it would hurt a lot.63 In 
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1997, a plurality (45 percent) thought that the effect ofNAFTA was to keep wages 
down6~ and that it would take jobs away (46 percent).65 About a third agreed that NAFTA 
had already cost jobs in their area, and only 9 percent were of the opinion that the treaty 
had created jobs.66 
When asked in 1999 what the U.S. should do in regards to the NAFTA treaty, 24 percent 
of Americans polled agreed that the U.S. should continue with the treaty, 18 percent 
agreed the U.S. should pull out, and 40 percent were ofthe opinion that NAFTA should 
be amended.67 
World Trade Organization (WTO) and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) 
In 1994, when asked how much they had heard about GATT' s new Uruguay Round to 
reduce trade barriers among its members (it had just been signed), about 64 percent of the 
public had heard about the agreement, while 36 percent knew little or nothing about it.68 
This level of awareness parallels that for NAFTA suggesting that about a third of the 
American public doesn't follow international treaty issues even when an important 
decision is made. More people do become interested as political decisions draw closer 
and media coverage increases. 
In 1995, when Congress was preparing to consider the WTO's proposed role of 
administering the GATT treaty, the public was generally unaware of the new trade 
organization and its proposed trade rules.69 Californians had about the same level of 
awareness as the national public. When asked how closely they followed the issue in the 
news, only about one-third ofboth national and California respondents were aware of the 
issue. In both cases, public interest and awareness increased as the issue moved toward a 
political decision. When asked if they favored or opposed the treaty, Californians tended 
to be more supportive than the public nationally. 
In 2000, a national poll found that 62 percent of surveyed Americans agreed that U.S. 
participation in the WTO is good for the U.S., compared to 20 percent who believe it is 
bad. 70 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
In 1998, only 25 percent of the public felt that the U.S. should contribute more money to 
the IMF to address global finance crises, and 51 percent were opposed. In contrast, 82 
percent of the leaders polled supported IMF contributions.71 
REGIONAL AND NATIONAL ISSUES 
Europe 
Public concern about economic competition between the U.S., Japan, and Europe was 
high in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 72 In 1994, Americans saw Europe as more 
important than Asia to U.S. interests and viewed the European Economic Union 
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positively. About one third of the U.S. public believed that European Union trade 
practices were unfair, compared to 27 percent of the leaders polled. 73 In 1999, the public 
was concerned about how well the government was managing trade disputes with 
Europe, with 40 percent giving it a top priority. 74 
Chart 5 
U.S. Public Opinion about the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
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Mexico 
The American public has varied in its perceptions about the importance of Mexico to 
U.S. economic interests (Chart 6). The variations seem to follow Mexico's internal 
economic and political cycles. Throughout the 1994-1998 period, U.S. leaders appeared 
to be less volatile than the public, in that they strongly felt (94-98 percent) that Mexico is 
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Brazil 
As with Mexico, American public interest seems to track the internal economic and 
domestic fortunes ofBrazil.76 Following the recent Asian economic crisis (1998), which 
also affected Brazil, U.S. leaders, and the public to a much lesser degree, agreed that 
Brazil is of vital interest to the U.S. (Chart 7). The leaders interest peaked sharply from 
49 percent in 1994 to 7 5 percent in 1998, after a period of declining interest. 
Chart 7 
U.S. Leaders and Public pinion Agreement t at 
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China 
During the Cold War, Americans' attitudes toward China were generally unfavorable.77 
However, they became more positive over time, reaching a favorable 72 percent rating in 
a 1989 poll. Following the Tiananmen Square tragedy, there was a large decline to a 
favorable rating of only 34 percent in August 1989. Ten years later, a Gallup poll found 
this unfavorable attitude continued (38 percent favorable ).78 Another 1999 poll found 
Americans to be about evenly divided over which policy should be given higher priority 
with China: advancing economic interests (43 percent) or improving human rights (42 
percent).79 The public did not support the loss of American jobs in exchange for 
improving human rights in China.80 
In 1999, over half (54 percent) of Americans surveyed favored the just-completed 
agreement between China and the U.S. enabling China to join the WTO. This was about 
the same proportion of Americans who favored the NAFTA agreement in 1993. In 
contrast, around a third of those polled felt the treaty was a bad idea. Many Americans 
(60 percent) thought that the treaty would have a major impact on the U.S. economy. 81 
Less than half (43 percent) of American conservatives favored the agreement, compared 
to 62 percent of liberals and 60 percent of moderates. While 56 percent ofthe survey 
respondents agreed that the WTO agreement with China 
would help American companies, 59 percent felt that it would hurt American workers 
(compared to 35 percent who said it would help workers). Given the choice, respondents 
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(61 percent) were more inclined to wait for the Chinese government to make 
improvements in political and religious freedoms before entering into the trade 
87 agreement. -
A 2000 poll found that 57 percent of Americans agreed that trade between the U.S. and 
China would mostly hurt American workers, while 28 percent said it would mostly 
help.83 Slightly more of the respondents were inclined to believe that increased trade with 
China would benefit our economy than would hurt ( 48 percent to 3 7 percent). Younger 
Americans were more optimistic, with 59 percent of those surveyed between the ages of 
18 and 29 believing that the I IS economy would benefit A third ofthis younger group 
felt that trade would also help U.S. workers. Americans with higher incomes or levels of 
education were most likely to agree (87 percent) that increased trade would mostly help 
the Chinese economy. Almost half of Americans agreed that increased trade would help 
human rights in China, while 18 percent had no opinion. 84 
National Foreign Trade Goals 
Most Americans favor an active role for the U.S. in world affairs (65 percent). This is 
particularly true for leaders (almost 100 percent). Both figures, reported for 1994, have 
remained relatively unchanged since World War II. 85 Nonetheless, the importance of 
foreign policy on the national agenda has declined. Not a single foreign policy issue 
appeared on the public's top ten list of national issues. This was even true of leaders. 
Domestic issues, particularly the recession and crime led both lists.86 
In 1996, 57 percent of Californians felt that it was important for presidential candidates to 
have the "right position" on foreign trade. This was particularly important to 
Republicans.87 A hint as to what that position might be is revealed in a 1997 poll. In 
1997, the American public was asked what role government should take to ensure that 
workers and businesses benefit from international trade. Forty percent of survey 
respondents agreed that government should not protect businesses or workers but should 
help both to compete; 37 percent felt that the government should protect workers; and 17 
percent agreed that government should not be involved in the issue at all. 88 
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